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MAQUILADORA OPERATIONS
A COMMENT ON THE MAQUILADORA PROGRAM IN
MEXICO
Zack V. Chayet*
The Maquiladora program was instituted in Mexico in the early
1960s. The purpose of this program was to create jobs for Mexi-
cans, attract foreign investment, and bring needed technology to
Mexico. In the Maquiladora program components, equipment, and
machinery can enter Mexico duty free, where they are then assem-
bled. The finished products are then exported to the United States.
Initially the process included only assembly operations. Today
the program, which is spread throughout the entire Mexican border
region, includes high-technology operations encompassing every as-
pect of the manufacturing process. The Maquiladora program is
now the second most important industry in Mexico, generating rev-
enues surpassing even the tourism industry.
There are close to 740 Maquiladora plants operating in Mexico.
Participants include manufacturers of toys, furniture, clothing,
medical products, and other goods. Throughout Mexico, close to
200,000 individuals are employed in the Maquiladora program. In
the Ensenada, Tijuana, and Tecate areas there are more than 300
American and Japanese companies employing a total of 35,000
workers.
Labor costs as little as seventy-five cents per hour in Tijuana.
When one compares these wages with the average United States
hourly wage, the incentive to operate a plant is Mexico is obvious.
The Tijuana area is populated with over one million people. The
Department of Binational Affairs of the San Diego Council reports
that by the year 2000, the Tijuana and San Diego area will have
approximately four million people. Sixty percent of these people
will be between eighteen and twenty-three years of age. As long as
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U.S.' production costs remain high, cheap Mexican labor will be
attractive and conducive to the expansion of the Maquiladora
industry.
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AN OVERVIEW OF THE MAQUILADORA INDUSTRY
Norris C. Clement*
Each day offshore export processing zones (EPZ's) become a
more integral part of the international economy, playing a larger
part in the manufacture and assembly of a growing array of goods
and services. Goods displaying labels with "Made in the U.S.A." or
"Made in Japan" are less common now than ten years ago. They
are being replaced with "Made in Taiwan" or "Assembled in Mex-
ico." These labels indicate more than a geographical shift in the
production of some consumer goods. They represent a deliberate
thrust towards a new development strategy for a growing number
of large and small nations scattered throughout the world. This
strategy is more "outward looking" than previously.
I. THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF MAQUILADORAS
For the United States, the use of "offshore sourcing" began as a
side effect of establishing manufacturing facilities in Europe, be-
hind tariff walls, in order to increase sales to the giant European
Economic Community. For Japan, frequently called a nation of
maquiladoras because of its elaborate subcontracting system, the
decision to use offshore EPZ's apparently was a part of a deliberate
strategy to gain market shares in a world dominated by the United
States. Mexico created the maquiladora industry as an EPZ be-
cause of both the demonstrated success of other EPZ's in the Far
East, such as Taiwan and Singapore, and Mexico's need to solve
pressing social and economic problems.
* Professor, Economics Department, San Diego State University.
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The Border Industrialization Program, which gave birth to the
industry in the mid-1960s, was designed to reduce unemployment
in Mexico's northern border region, generate foreign exchange, and
stimulate technology transfer to Mexico by attracting foreign man-
ufacturing firms there to establish assembly operations. Since then,
and especially since the peso devaluations dating from 1982, the
industry has grown rapidly.
The term "maquiladora" comes from the Spanish word maquila,
which in colonial Mexico was the charge that millers collected for
processing grain. Today maquiladora stands as a generic term for
those firms which "process" (assemble and/or transform in some
way) components imported into Mexico which are then reexported.
Alternatively it can be said that maquiladora is an economic unit
for the production of goods or services based on the temporary im-
portation of raw materials and equipment to be transformed in
Mexico and subsequently sold abroad.
The term "in-bond" industry comes from the fact that those
components which are imported into Mexico are imported under a
bonded status in order to insure that they are not sold in Mexico
markets, but are reexported for sales in foreign markets.
Another term frequently used is "twin plants," which refers to
the existence of two factories, one on either side of the border.
However, this does not accurately describe the arrangement for
most companies, since most of the foreign parent plants are not
located anywhere near the border. Originally, it was thought that
labor-intensive maquiladora operations in Mexico would assemble
components produced in capital intensive plants in the United
States, presumably in the border region, and then distribute the fi-
nal products from the U.S. border plants. Generally, however, this
has not proved to be the case.'
At the end of 1986 there were, according to unofficial figures,
approximately 1,000 plants in the industry nationwide, employing
approximately 300,000 people and generating some 1.6 billion U.S.
I. Clement & Jenner, Location Decisions Regarding Maquiladora/ln-Bond Plants
Operating in Baja California, Mexico, San Diego, California, Institute for Regional Studies
of the Californias, San Diego State University, (1987).
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dollars in foreign exchange.2 About 90% of these in-bond plants are
located in northern Mexico bordering the states of California, Ari-
zona, New Mexico, and Texas. Most of these plants are owned by,
or have contracted relationships with, U.S. firms. Currently Mexico
produces approximately 40% of the goods imported into the United
States from developing countries under Tariff articles 806 and 8071
which allow duties to be paid on only the "value added" abroad.4
Given its relative size and rate of growth, the maquiladora is the
newest "glamour industry" along the U.S.-Mexican border. It is
suggested that eventually the maquiladora industry will provide the
same economic stimulation to depressed U.S. border communities
that Mexican shoppers did during the oil boom period of 1977-
1981. This "maquiladora boom" is attributed to several types of
potential advantages to U.S. or other foreign firms, which produce
relatively completed products having significant labor costs. These
advantages include:
1. Significantly reduced costs, especially labor;
2.
Table 1. The Maquiladora Industry in Mexico: Plants,
Employment, and Value Added*
Date Total No. Total Employment Value Added
Year of Plants (Yearly average) Dollars
1965 3,000
1966 57 4,257
1967 72 17,936
1968 79 17,000
1969 108 15,858
1970 120 20,327 81
1971 209 20,000 102
1972 339 48,060 165
1973 357 64,330 278
1974 455 75,974 444
1975 454 67,214 454
1976 448 74,496 536
1977 443 78,433 525
1978 547 90,704 714
1979 540 111,365 638
1980 620 119,546 773
1981 605 130,973 976
1982 585 127,048 851
1983 600 150,867 829
1984 672 199,684 1,200
1985 789 217,544 1,300
1986 858 246,617 1,600
* Through May 1986
Sources: Instituto Nacional de Estadigtica e lnformaci6n (INEGI); various publications.
3. See infra note I I and accompanying text.
4. See Table 2 on following page.
1987]
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2. One hundred percent foreign ownership, not usually possible in
Mexico; and
3. Proximity to the United States allowing:
a) lower transportation and communications costs,
b) the possibility of management and technical personnel liv-
ing in the United States,
c) shorter down time for repairs and new product lines, and
d) greater control over day-to-day operations.
The available literature, although sparse, indicates there are sig-
nificant benefits to the U.S. border cities in terms of increased in-
comes, jobs, and tax revenues associated with the growth of indus-
try in Mexico.' Because of these advantages, both government
agencies and private firms located in the United States and Mexi-
can border states implemented promotional campaigns designed to
attract U.S. and other foreign firms to establish in-bond plants in
Mexican locations adjacent to the United States.
The growth of the maquiladora/in-bond industry has been quite
extraordinary as can be seen from the data presented in Table 1.
Since 1965, the number of plants, total employment, and value
added have grown almost every year during the industry's twenty
Table 2. Dutiable Value of Imports Under 806/807 from Less
Developed Countries, 1985.
Country U.S. $ (millions) Percent
Mexico $2,265 40
Singapore 938 17
Taiwan 586 10
Hong Kong 431 8
Malaysia 618 11
Philippines 375 7
Korea 349 6
Haiti 61 1
TOTALS $5,642 100%
Source: Journal of the Flagstaff Institute 1986, as reported in The Industrial Development
Commission of Mexicali, MANUFACTURING IN MEXICALI: THE IN-BOND OR MAQUI-
LADORA INDUSTRY HANDBOOK, 8th ed., Mexicali, 1986.
5. William L. Mitchell, Economic Impact of Maquila Industry in Juarez, Mexico in
El Paso, Texas and other sections of the United States for 1985, CIUDAD JUAREZ, GRUPO
BERMUDEZ INDUSTRIAL PARKS, 1986; and Clement & Jenner, supra note 3.
6. See supra note I.
[Vol. 18
6
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 18, No. 1 [2015], Art. 11
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol18/iss1/11
MAQUILADORA OPERATIONS
year lifespan. Table 37 illustrates the wide diversity of goods that
are processed in the industry. These tables demonstrate that various
types of electrical and electronic goods are clearly the most impor-
tant group of products to pass through the maquiladora process,
with apparel being the next most important product group.
Table 48 shows that despite Baja California's dominance in terms
of number of plants (40%), the State of Chihuahua clearly gener-
ates the most jobs and the most value added. Larger "Fortune 500"
firms from the mid-west and eastern United States tend to fill Chi-
huahua's roster of U.S. firms, while Baja California seems to at-
tract smaller, less well-known firms, mainly from Southern
California.
Nevertheless, Baja California may just now be coming into its
own in the sense that several large Japanese companies have lo-
cated "twin plants" in the Southern California-Baja California re-
gion in the belief that it will, in the medium and long term, provide
the best possible environment for capitalizing on some key develop-
ments including:
1. Increased sourcing from Far East EPZ's;
7.
Table 3. In-bond Manufacturing Plants in Mexico. Number of
Plants and Number of Employees According to Product
Categories (October 1985).
Plants Number of (%) Number of (%)
Plants Plants
I. Electronic and electrical materials and
accessories 198 (25) 56,907 (25)
2. Electronic and electrical machinery and
appliances 86 (II) 45,816 (20)
3. Apparel 110 (14) 32,149 (14)
4. Transportation equipment and accessories 69 (9) 44,441 (19)
5. Services 44 (6) 14,075 (6)
6. Furniture 72 (9) 7,168 (3)
7. Toys and sporting goods 24 (3) 7,418 (3)
8. Shoes and leather 36 (5) 4,896 (2)
9. Food process 12 (2) 2,149 (1)
10. Tools 21 (3) 2,516 (1)
11. Chemical products 3 (-)* 99 *()
12. Other industries 111 (14) 14,889
TOTALS 786 (101**) 232,523 (100)
* Less than 1%.
** Adds up to 101 due to rounding.
Source: "Estadistica de la industria maquiladora de exportaci6n, Octubre 1985." INEGI,
Direcci6n General de lnform~tica, Mexico, D.F., 1985.
Source: "Estadistica de la industria maquiladora de exportacion, Octubre 1985." INEGI,
Direccion General de Informatica, Mexico, D.F., 1985.
8. See Table 4 on following page.
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2. The possibility of distributing to U.S. markets from west to
east;
3. Favorable wage and utility rates in Baja California;
4. A growing California market;9
5. A growing protectionist mood in the U.S. Congress; and
6. The tendency for the U.S. dollar to be devalued with respect
to the Japanese yen.
These and other factors are attracting other Asian countries to
opportunities that many industry observers believe are fantastic.
However, there are problems in the industry. High employee turno-
ver rates, worker absenteeism, lack of physical infrastructure, and
Table 4. Maquiladora Plants by Principal Cities and States
January-August 1985
Plants Employment *Value Added
NATIONAL TOTAL 747 207,817 190,248
BAJA CALIFORNIA 301(40) 38,691(19) 34,383(18)
Ensenada 9 481 478
Mexicali 75 10,863 10,572
Tecate 31 1,713 1,148
Tijuana 180 25,697 22,185
BAJA CALIFORNIA SUR
La Paz 4 150 126
COAHUILA 50 13,140 8,154
Ciudad Acufia 24 6,032 3,666
Piedras Negras 19 4,496 2,379
Others 7 2,612 2,109
CHIHUAHUA 193(25) 87,951(42) 83,644
Ciudad Judrez 167 76,664 75,071
Ciudad Chihuahua
and Ojinaga 26 11,287 8,573
JALISCO
Guadalajara 14 5,064 7,587
ESTADO DE MEXICO
AND MEXICO, D.F. 5 149 373
SONORA 82 22,088 16,233
Agua Prieta 24 5,699 3,676
Nogales 49 14,661 3,676
Others 9 1,728 964
TAMAULIPAS 75(10) 36,167(17) 35,135(18)
Matamoros 35 20,218 22,744
Nuevo Laredo 14 3,668 3,514
Ciudad Reynosa y
Rio Bravo 26 12,281 8,877
OTHER STATES 23 4,417 4,609
* Value added in millions of pesos. Percentages in parentheses.
Source: "Estadistica de la industria maquiladora de exportaci6n, Enero, 1986" INEGI, 1986.
9. See supra note 1.
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shortages of trained technical and supervisory personnel are most
frequently mentioned as being potential bottlenecks over the next
three to five years. Yet most estimates see the industry expanding
at a 10% to 12% rate for some time.
II. THE MAQUILADORA DEBATE IN CONGRESS
It seems appropriate to comment on the debate on the maqui-
ladora in the U.S. Congress during the last year. While I have
presented my views on this debate in some detail elsewhere,1" a
short summary of the debate in view of the findings of our study
might prove useful.
The main issue must be seen in the larger context of U.S. "com-
petitiveness." It focuses mainly on whether or not to retain articles
806/807 of the United States Tariff Schedule.' These articles per-
mit the importation of products that have been assembled or some-
how "processed" abroad while duties are levied only on the "value
added" to the (mainly) U.S.-manufactured components in the for-
eign country, as opposed to paying duties on the entire value of the
imported product.
This issue reemerged in October 1986 (it has already been de-
bated extensively in the 1970s) when the Department of Commerce
used federal funds to promote the Mexican maquiladora program
among U.S. corporations at the "Expo Maquila" trade fair in
Acapulco, Mexico.
The congressional hearings, questioned both the propriety of us-
ing federal funds for such a purpose and the wisdom of preserving
articles 806/807. Representatives from mid-western and eastern
states are calling attention to the millions of U.S. jobs that have
been lost, and to the economic and social damage to affected com-
munities in recent years as a consequence of all types of imports.
Their major point is that production sharing has not been employed
by U.S corporations as a defensive measure to maintain competi-
tiveness, but as another way of increasing profits and exacting
"givebacks," at the expense of U.S labor and the health of the en-
tire U.S. economy.
Nevertheless most corporations, with assembly plants in Mexico,
assert that they had to "go offshore" in order to maintain market
10. Clement & Jenner, Maquiladora: Do More Jobs for Mexico Benefit America as
Well?, San Diego Union, Feb. 22, 1987.
II. See U.S.T.S.A. (1987).
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share, and that production sharing actually saves the many higher
skilled manufacturing jobs in the U.S. which produce the compo-
nents assembled abroad. They also claim that using plants in Mex-
ico is much better for the U.S. economy than using similar facilities
in more remote areas such as Taiwan because many of the dollars
spent in Mexico and in support of Mexican facilities come right
back to the United States in the various forms noted above. Thus,
eliminating articles 806/807 would cause firms to either completely
relocate their production facilities off shore or to increase their
sourcing to EPZ's which are able to increase domestic value added
to the required 35% in order to minimize tariffs.
The findings of our study cannot be used to support conclusively
either of these two positions. The study was not designed to test
such propositions. Information gathered in the course of the study,
mainly in face-to-face interviews with maquiladora administrators
on both sides of the border, can, however, be helpful in understand-
ing the dynamics of this industry and how those dynamics are likely
to affect U.S. and Mexican competitive standing and jobs in the
interim.
First, it should be noted that there is ample evidence to support
both sides of the debate. Clearly, the Mexican plants both maintain
and improve profitability and market share. However, sourcing in
Mexico has some negative effects on U.S. (especially California)
employment which may weaken unions or individual workers' bar-
gaining positions. The major U.S. question concerning the Mexican
maquiladora industry is, whether the elimination of articles 806/
807 would save U.S. jobs and compel U.S. industry to act more
responsibly with respect to the overall health of the economy. Given
the fact that most U.S firms operating in Mexico use a high pro-
portion of U.S. inputs, it would seem that eliminating 806/807
would not save jobs or benefit the U.S. economy.
Additionally, it must be acknowledged that any answer to this
question must be given within the context of the present complex
configuration of tariff laws. These laws include a General System of
Preferences (GSP) which allows certain developing nations to ex-
port limited quantities of goods (with at least 35% of the value
added in the developing country) duty free to developed countries
such as the United States. Thus U.S. companies, involved in off
shore sourcing, have two alternatives for minimizing costs related
to import duties, articles 806/807 of the U.S. Tariff Schedule and
the GSP. And, for such firms the GSP alternative is the more desir-
[Vol. 18
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able of the two.
Moreover, U.S. firms involved in international production sharing
are more likely to be able to get GSP tariff breaks through Asian
EPZ's than Mexican. Interviews carried out in conjunction with
this study indicated that very few firms operating in Mexico are
able to increase the domestic (Mexican) content of their products
sufficiently to reach the required 35%. Thus, U.S. firms operating
Mexican maquilas are increasingly using Asian inputs in order to
lower overall costs. When asked if they would prefer to use Mexi-
can inputs, virtually all responded that they would, but inferior
quality, high prices and unreliable delivery had kept them from do-
ing so.
The Mexican government is very concerned about this situation
and has carried out a number of studies to determine both the po-
tential demand for, and supply of, inputs into the maquiladora in-
dustry. One of the major objectives of the Mexican government
over the last decade or so has been to integrate border industry,
(and specifically the maquiladora industry) into the national econ-
omy which is mainly located in the interior of Mexico (i.e., in Mex-
ico City, Monterrey and Guadalajara). Thus, the government is
now actively promoting Mexican manufacturing firms, which cur-
rently have a large excess capacity, to gear up to the requirements
of the maquiladora firms in order to respond to what appears to be
a golden opportunity. This seems to be the most important new de-
velopment with respect to the Mexican maquiladora industry and
could have significant impacts on the 806/807 debate.
Currently U.S. proponents of the maquiladora industry lobbying
for the continued existence of articles 806/807, build their case
mainly on the claim that those provisions save U.S jobs which pro-
duce U.S. components utilized in EPZ's throughout the world, but
mainly in Mexico. In other words, articles 806/807 save U.S. jobs
by utilizing U.S. components in Mexico that otherwise would be
lost to Asian suppliers that tend to utilize the provisions of GSP.
However, the current situation is changing rapidly. Not only are
U.S. firms increasing their use of Asian inputs in their Mexican
plants, but pressure is building for Mexican manufacturing firms to
increase their sales to maquiladora firms. Thus, it is possible that
within a few years, articles 806/807 will be less significant than
they are today, despite the rapid growth of the maquiladora indus-
try. This could make claims that articles 806/807 save U.S. jobs,
less valid and less applicable than they are today.
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A dramatic increase in the use of Mexican inputs in U.S.-based
maquiladoras would significantly advance the Mexican economy
and would satisfy U.S. policy-makers who fear that Mexico's cur-
rent economic crisis could be a source of future political instability.
But, Mexico's gain, resulting in the increased export of U.S. jobs,
will imply our loss. Thus, the maquiladora debate could reemerge.
The debate will probably disappear permanently only when the
U.S. economy has moved closer to full employment.
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